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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERI\fAN V. LUND, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
~fOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY 
CO~IPANY, 
Defendant and App~ella1d. 
Case No. 9389 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
For the sake of brevity, reference to the record on 
appeal will be designated in parentheses by the capital 
letter "R", followed by the page number; reference to 
the testimony or transcript 'vill be sho,vn by the capital 
letter "T"; and reference to the exhibits 'vill be shown 
by the abbreviations "Plf's. Ex.'' or ''Def's. Ex.", fol-
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lowed by the exhibit number. The words "appellant" and 
"defendant" will designate ~fountain Fual Supply Com-
pany, and the words "respondent" and '"plaintiff'' ,,Tjll 
designate Sherman V. Lund. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant, ~Iountain Fuel Supply Co1npany, is a 
Utah corporation, engaged in the business of distributing 
natural gas in certain areas in the State of Utah. In 
the month of May 1958, the defendant was selling natural 
gas to plaintiff at his home located at 71 East 6700 South 
Street, City of Bountiful, Davis County, Utah. Such 
gas was transported to this area by means of a 2-inch 
gas main running east and west and located directly 
across the street from plaintiff's home ( T 21). A 3/! 
inch service or feeder line extended from this main line 
in a northerly direction to plaintiff's house. Tllis line 
was connected to the 1nain line by means of a riser or 
nipple and a dresser coupling ( T :27) Def's. Ex. No. 1 
is a fair representation of the aforementioned line and 
tap (T 185). 
In the latter part of ~lay 1958, plaintiff and his wife 
noticed a wilting and discoloration of a part of their 
lawn and foliage (7 57, 7:2). He asked his wife to call 
the County Agent in regard to this and the Agent, in 
response to her call, suggested she notify the defendant 
( T51). On June 17, 1958, l\lrs. Lund called the defendant 
and reported a possible leak (T72). The defendant re-
sponded immediately by dispatehing tw~·o employees, ~lr. 
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.J(akin and .lllr. Clark, to investigate .lllrs. Lund's report 
cr 1S:2). In their inve~tigation ~1r. (jlark and ~Ir. ~lakin 
discovered a break in the service tap near the rnain line 
directly across the stree from plaintiff's residence ( rr 
183). This break \Vas repaired immediately by Mr. 
Clark and his rre\v (T 183). ~1r. ~lakin stated that the 
rnain line and tap had been buried approximately three 
feet deep, but that sorne people, in building a new home 
directly across the street, had removed the soil frorn the 
top of thi~ u1ain line and tap, leaving it approximately 
16 inches below the surface ( T 24, 25, 39). He further 
stated that the rnan who lived in the house directly across 
the street from plaintiff told him that a dual-wheeled 
cement truck became stuck directly over this tap (T 13). 
The record shows that the tire tracks and indentation in 
the earth were approximately 12 inches in depth and 
within approxin1ately four inches of the main line (T 
25). This pressure exerted on the service line by this 
truck caused the nipple to break directly below the top 
of the 90 degree elbo,v, thus causing natural gas to escape 
into the surrounding soil (T 29) and subsequently into 
the front yard of plaintiff's residence (T 195). 
STATE:.\II~NT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
The trial court erred (a) in perrnitting the case to 
go to the jury in the absence of any standard in evidence 
by which the jury could determine \\~hether or not defen-
dant's gas line was at a proper depth; (b) in permitting 
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the jury to supply such lack of evidence by "view'' of 
premises ; and (c) by refusing to grant defendant's 
motions to dismiss based upon such lack of evidence. 
POINT II 
The trial court com1nitted prejudicial error in giv-
ing Instruction No. 6, which ,,,.as leading, suggestive, con-
trary to the evidence, and 'vithdrew from the jury's con-
sideration the question of ",.hether defendant "\Yas na-
gligent, and the court enhanced this error by requiring 
the jury to determine dan1ages irrespective of the find-
ings upon other questions submitted. 
ARGUMENT 
POIKT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED (A) IN PERMITTING THE 
CASE TO GO TO THE JURY IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY 
STANDARD IN EVIDENCE BY \YHICH 'THE JURY COULD 
DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT'S GAS 
LINE WAS AT A PROPER DEPTH; (B) IN PERMITTING 
THE JURY TO SUPPLY SUCH LACK OF EVIDENCE BY 
''VIEW" OF ·THE PREMISES; AND (C) BY REFUSING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS BASED 
UPON SUCH LACK OF EVIDENCE. 
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defen-
dant moved to dis1niss on the grounds that the plaintiff 
failed to prove that the defendant "\Yas negligent; that 
there was no casual connection betw·een the plaintiffs 
alleged injury and the defendant ~s act or failure to act, 
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and that plaintiff failed to prove damages. The n1otion 
"·as again rene,,·ed at the close of defendant's evidence 
( T :2:27, 228). These Inotions were taken under advise-
Inent by the court and on November 29, 1960, after the 
conclusion of the trial and prior to entering judg1.nent 
therein, the motion \vas again renewed by the defendant 
(T 2±7). In refusing to grant these motions and after 
having ruled out the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the 
eourt stated: 
~'The other findings as to negligence in either 
burying the pipe too shallow or leaving it at a 
depth after change in the area gives me consider-
able trouble. 
"I have thought about that since this trial. The 
only standard \vhich is put in evidence is that the 
usual pipeline is buried in three feet. This ended 
up not to exceed nine inches from the top. In the 
verbal testimony it could not be sustained. I be-
lieve, however, in view of the premises and in 
view of the location and in view of the dug-up 
pipe I think the jury could reason from that, that 
this pipeline was too shallow. I recognize that this 
may be a slight change from the designation i:o. 
the doctor ease where you have a clear standard 
for a company or a doctor. The pipeline being 
such, in the explanation, I believe they could do 
it. 
"I'll leave it stand and see ho\v you gentleinen later 
stand." (T 249) 
In this the court recognized that the eviden(·e ad-
duced at the trial \vas not sufficient to sustain the jury's 
verdict but stated that since the jury had viewed the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
pre1nises, the jury could reason that the pipeline was 
too shallow and thus overruled the defendant's motion 
to dismiss. In doing this, the trial court committed pre-
judicial error as a jur~· is not per1nitted to vie\v premises 
for the purpose of supvlying evidence or to obtain ne\v 
or additional evidence. 
This court held, inter alia, in the case of Sorenson 
v. D.&R.G. Railroad Company, 49 Utah 548, 164 Pac. 
1020, that the purpose of a jury in viewing the pre1nises 
was to enable theu1 to better understand and more fully 
appreciate the evidence produced before them in open 
court, and not for the purpose of taking independent tes-
timoi'.y. See also Redd v. ..A .. ir\Yay ~Iotor Coach Lines, 
104 lJtah 9, 137 P.2d 37 ±; Portland-Seattle Auto Frieght 
v. Jones, 15 W ash.2d 603, 131 P.2d 736. 
As noted in the above excerpt, the trial court w·as of 
the opinion that the jury could reason, after having ~een 
the "dug-up pipe" in place, that it \Yas too shallo\v. In 
ado:plJ1ng this theory, the court con1n1itted prejudicial 
error as there \Ya8 no standard in evidence to guide the 
jury in making ~ueh a deter1nination. ,,~ e subnrit that the 
jury could not find that the defendant ~s gas lines \\Tere 
too shallo\\T bl•eause it had no standard \vith \\~hich to 
compare the depth of these lines. The fact that the line 
\\Tas hit and broken is not evidence of negligence because 
negligence cannot be a~su1ned fron1 an injury. 
An analogous situation is found in 1nedical malprac-
tice cases in \vhich this court has consistently held that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
evidence Inust be submitted showing that the act or 
acts eotnplained of \\'Pl'P not in accordance '''ith accepted 
standards of professional skill. In the case of Huggins 
v. II icken, G lTtah :2d ~;);), 310 P.~d 5~3, this court stated: 
H Plaintiff contends that so long as there re1nains 
some evidence, lay or otherwise, upon \\~hich a 
finding of negligent'e could rest, the case should 
go to thP jury. This is undoubtedly correct if the 
facts testified to are such as to sho\v that the 
medical standard of care shown by expert evi-
dence was breached b:- defendant. Absence such 
evidence, in a case involving complex post oper-
ative treatment, inferences based on mere lay 
h.!lo\vledge should not be sub1nitted to a jury. As 
this court said in Forrest v. Eason, 1953, Utah, 
261 P.2d 178, 180: 'Giving the case to the jury 
under such circumstances (when certain fluids 
were injected into the veins by a naturopath) 
'vith no sho\ving that use of the substances was 
not in accordance with accepted standards of pro-
fessional skill, * * * \vith no showing that any of 
the substances \vere deleterious, allows the jury 
to indulge in that t}lJe of speculation unpermit-
ted by this or other courts generally' * * *' '. 
See also Anderson v. Xixon, 104 Utah ~G2, 139 P.2d 216. 
The same rule of law would apply in the instant 
case, i.e., some evidence must sho\\~ that the defendant 
permitted its gas lines to re1nain too close to the sur-
face, thus violating an accepted standard. In the ab-
sence of such evidence, there is nothing upon \vhich a 
jury can base its findings. It must have substantial 
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evidence upon which to base a verdict and may not inject 
inferences based on lay knowledge. The depth at ",.hich 
a natural gas line is buried is not so common that lay-
men can say if it was proper or not. Such information 
is peculiarly within the knowledge of men trained in 
this type of endeavor. In some instances a certain depth 
may be considered proper while in other instances it 
may not. The only evidence in the record on this point 
is the testimony of 1\Ir. J\Iakin in ,,~hich he stated that 
the lines were installed at a depth of three feet and that 
after the top cover had been removed they were approxi-
mately 16 inches below the surface ( T 25, 39). \\T e sub-
mit that this will not support a finding that defendant's 
lines were permitted to remain too close to the surface. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMl\II'TTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 6, WHICH WAS 
LEADING, SUGGESTIVE, CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE, 
AND WITHDREW FROM THE JURY'S CONSIDERA'TION 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS NEG-
LIGENT, AND THE COURT ENHANCED THIS ERROR BY 
REQUIRING THE JURY TO DETERl\IINE DAMAGES IR-
RESPECTIVE OF THE FINDINGS UPON OTHER QUES-
TIONS SUBMITTED. 
Instruction No. 6 (R 58, 59. 60), to \\~hich counsel 
for defendant objeet.ed strenuously (T 234, 277), reads 
as follows: 
"No. 6 
The court desires to ascertain the extent the 
plaintiff has been da1naged as a result of gas seep-
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age into his property as a result of a break 
or leak in the line across the street referred to in 
the evidence as having been repaired June 17, 
1958. The measure of such loss equals the differ-
ence in the fair 1narket value of the house and lot 
of the plaintiff i1nmediately before and immedi-
ately· after the injury and damage to his property 
were inflicted but must not be less than the actual 
value of plants destroyed pius those not totally 
destroyed or damaged calculated by determining 
the value of the plants before damage and their 
value after the damage. 
'~Answer the following question if you can do so 
in light of the evidence as you view it: 
"1-A What is the total damage proven by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence to be proximately 
caused by the seepage of gas in guestion ~ 
Answer: $1,800.00 
"Explanation : 
The parties have agreed that the gas that seeped 
into the plaintiff's yard at the time in question 
came fro1n a break or leak located generally where 
the feeder line that serves the Lund property 
connects to the main line. The court desires to 
ascertain certain facts concerning the cause of 
the break or leak. Therefore, you as jurors are 
asked to answer certain questions set forth below, 
if you are able to do so as you view the evidence : 
"2-A Is it at least just as probable that one of 
the proximate causes of the break or leak was the 
passage of vehicles over the line in the vicinity 
of the break or leak as it is that such alleged 
event \vas not proximate cause of the break or 
leak~ 
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Answer : Yes. 
"2-B Do you find it proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the defendant's main line and/or 
feeder line to the Lund property was negligently 
installed or permitted to remain too near the sur-
face, thereby subjecting others to an unreasonable 
risk that it would be broken and plant life dam-
aged~ 
Answer: Yes 
'~ 2-C If you have answered question 2-B 'yes', 
then answer this question if you can: If you an-
swer question 2-B 'no', pass this question: 
Was the negligence found in 2-B a proximate 
cause of the break or leak complained of? 
Answer : Yes~, 
The above instruction correctly states that the par-
ties agreed that gas seeped into plaintiff's yard but in-
correctly assumes that this seepage caused plaintiff any 
damage. It was never sho\vn during the course of this 
trial that the seepage of natural gas in to plaintiff's yard 
was the cause of plaintiff's property damage. Plaintiff 
assumed that it \Yas, but failed to offer any proof on 
this point on \\Thich he had the affir1na tive burden. An 
instruction \v·hich is gi Yen \Yi thout eYidence in the record 
to justify it \\Till constitute error because by it the jury 
is told, at least inferentially, that there is son1e compe-
tant evidence upon \\Thich it is based. Green\Yood v. Kier, 
125 Colo. 333, 243 P .2d ±17. The test of the sufficiency 
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of evidPnce to support an instruction \vas stated by this 
court in the ease of Pollari v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 
~;>, 176 P.:Zd 111, in \\~hich the court said: 
"}:viden(·e suffic-ient to support a finding upon a 
particular issue is sufficient to support an in-
struetion upon such issue. See Randall's Instruc-
tion to Juries, Section 140." 
It is subn1itted that there is no evidence in the record 
to support a finding that plaintiff's property da1nage was 
due to natural gas. In fact, the only evidence on this 
matter \vas produced by the defendant's witness, }[r. 
DeBell, a garden consultant, \vho inspected the plaintiff's 
property several months after the alleged occurance, and 
\\~ho said that he could find no evidence of gas damage 
(T 203). 
A perusal of the foregoing instruction reveals that 
by giving Paragraph 1 thereof, the jury was lead to be-
lieve that damages \vas the principal question for deter-
mination, particularly in view of the following comment 
by the court : 
"I want you (the jury) to fix damages regardless 
of \vhat your other ans\vers are, just for my infor-
mation." ( T 239) 
This charge was tantamount to a direction of the verdict, 
as it \vithdre\v from the jury's consideration of defen-
dant's alleged negligence, thus depriving defendant of 
its constitutional right to have the jury detern1ine liabil-
ity. Paragraph 1 of this instruction assumes that defen-
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dant was negligent. This prejudiced the determination 
of an ultimate fact-negligence-by the jury. The gen-
eral rule relating to instructions which detennine ques-
tions of fact is found in 88 C.J.S. 788, Trial 285, which 
states: 
"An instruction \vhich directly or impliedly de-
termines an issuable question of fact is error and 
is properly refused if requested. Thus, where 
the question of negligence is one of fact, the rule 
applies.'' 
1 Reids Branson, Instructions to Juries, 3rd Ed. 14: 
"* * * The court n1ay not give instructions taking 
the decisions of questions of fact from the jury 
and neither may it speculate \vith the rights of 
parties by submitting matters to the jury \vhere 
no question of fact is involved * * *" 
It is respectfully submitted that this instruction is 
so patently defective that it cannot be cured by consider-
ing the instructions as a "~hole. The erroneous assmnp-
tion that the plaintiff's damage "Tas a result of the break 
in defendant's line cannot be aided by other instructions 
as it raises a conflict and is confusing to the jury. Any 
instruction \vhich i:s pre-en1ptory in form and directs a 
verdict, as this does, n1ust stand or fall on its own langu-
age and is not aided by other instructions. Boyer v. 
Gen. Oil Products, l\Io. 78 S.W.2d ±50; Gigoux v. Hen-
derson, 107 Kan. 325, 190 Pac. 1092; 53 Aln. Jur. 474, 
Trial 601. 
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(2uPstion :2- I~ of Instruction 6 is clearly leading, 
suggestivP, and <·ontrary to the eviden('<~. The first part 
of the question asked if the defendant's main line or 
feeder line \vas negligently installed. To properly submit 
this question to the jury there must be evidence in the 
record tending to show that the lines were negligently 
installed and that the defendant had installed or con-
structed them. The record is silent as to who installed 
these lines. The only evidence in the record relating to 
the installation of these lines is the testimony of Mr. 
~[akin and ~Ir. Clark, both of ''Tho1n stated they did not 
know \vho installed these lines ( T 12, 189). Both witnesses 
also said that the break in the line \vas not due to faulty 
construction or defective pipe ( T 29, 185). The plaintiff 
did not offer any proof on this question. Thus, we have 
a situation in \vhich an alleged act of specific negligence 
was submitted to the jury without evidence having been 
presented to support it. This type of instruction was 
discussed by this court in the case of Olsen v. W arwood, 
123 lTtah 111, 255 P.2d 725, \vherein the court stated: 
"It is \Yell settled in this jurisdiction that an in-
struction must be based on evidence, and that it 
is prejudicial error to submit a charged act of 
negligence to a jur~T for its consideration in the 
absence of evidence tending to support a finding 
that the act occurred. Smith v. Clark, 37 Utah 
116, 106 Pac. 653, 26 L.R.A., N.S., 953, and see 
Griffin v. Prudential Ins. Co., 10:2 Utah 
563, 133 P .2d 333, 1 ±-l A.L.R. 1-±0:2 ~ Kendall v. 
Fordham, 79 l:tah 256, 9 P. 2d 183. Like"rise it 
is \\Tell settled that the court 1uay not permit the 
jury to speculate upon the evidence and that a 
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finding of fact cannot be based upon sur1nise, 
conjecture, guess, or speculation. Jackson v. Col-
ston, 116 lT tah 295, 209 P .2d 566; Dern Inv. Co. 
v. Carbon County Land Co., 94 lTtah 76, 75 P.2d 
660 * * *". 
The second part of the special interrogatory, Ques-
tion 2-B, implies that the defendant's gas lines were per-
mitted to remain too near the surface, thereby subjecting 
other to an unreasonable risk. The testimony shows 
that the lines 'vere originally laid at a depth of three 
feet ( T 33, 39). The plaintiff did not offer any evidence 
to show that this \\Tas not a proper depth nor that any 
depth was proper. Thus, there \Yas no standard in evi-
dence which would guide the jury in determining \Vhat 
a proper depth for natural gas lines. As noted previously, 
a finding of fact cannot be based upon surmise, conjec-
ture, or speculation. The maintenance of a natural gas 
line is not so cominon that the layn1an can express an 
opinion as to \Yhat is reasonable care or a proper depth. 
The jury cannot assu1ne that because the line \\~as bro-
ken the depth where it \\Tas fom1d \\'"as in1proper. Xeg-
ligence cannot be assun1ed fro1n an injury. Yet this is 
the situation \vith \\'"hich the defendant \Yas faced w·hen 
the court gave the special interrogatory, Question 2-B. 
In returning an ans\\Ter of ··yes", the jury either found 
that the line 'vas negligently installed without any evi-
dence \vhatsoever relating to the installation, except as 
to depth, or that it \vas 1naintained at an in1proper depth 
in the absence of any Pvidence \\,.hatsoever as to \\'"hat was 
a proper depth. Even if there ,,,.ere adequate evidence to 
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support <"ith(•r (but not both) nnvroper installation or 
tnaintenaiH'P, an in~truction lH'rmitting the jury to specu-
late is fatal. 
For t hP foregoing reasons, the defendant respect-
fully reqnPsts that tlt(• decision of the district court be 
reversed and judgrnent be entered herein for the 
defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KASTLER & CRAWFORD 
JOl-IN CRAWFORD, JR. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
180 East First South St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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